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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On April 6, 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit handed 
down a decision that unwound decades of precedent.  The decision had the 
ability to lead to the United States denaturalizing and deporting more 
immigrants in a way that would violate the domestic goals of the country for 
immigration and naturalization, as well the United States’ obligations of non-
refoulement in the international community.1  In the court’s decision in 
United States v. Maslenjak, the Sixth Circuit ruled testimonial or 
documentary representations in the naturalization process need not be 
material to trigger criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a).2  Luckily, the 
Supreme Court reversed this decision in 2017, holding any misstatements 
must be material for criminal liability to be present.3 
Divna Maslenjak was born in a predominately-Serbian village in what is 
now the nation of Bosnia.4  Muslims in the surrounding region often clashed 
with ethnic Serbs in the area like the Maslenjaks.5  As the former Yugoslavia 
began to break up, the United States sent immigration officials to assist 
refugees that were fleeing the violent ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.6  In an 
interview to determine refugee eligibility, Divna Maslenjak (the primary 
applicant for her family’s asylum application) stated under oath that her 
family feared persecution because her husband, who lived apart from her 
from 1992 to 1997 to avoid being conscripted, did not serve in the military 
during the war.7  The Maslenjaks were given refugee status in 1999, 
                                                                                                                   
 1 United States v. Maslenjak, 821 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017). 
 2 18 U.S.C.S. § 1425(a) (LexisNexis 2016) (stating that “(a)  Whoever knowingly procures 
or attempts to procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person, or documentary or 
other evidence of naturalization or of citizenship; or (b) Whoever, whether for himself or 
another person not entitled thereto, knowingly issues, procures or obtains or applies for or 
otherwise attempts to procure or obtain naturalization, or citizenship, or a declaration of 
intention to become a citizen, or a certificate of arrival or any certificate or evidence of 
nationalization or citizenship, documentary or otherwise, or duplicates or copies of any of the 
foregoing—Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years (if the offense 
was committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this 
title [18 USCS § 2331])), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a drug 
trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this title [18 USCS § 929(a)])), 10 years (in 
the case of the first or second such offense, if the offense was not committed to facilitate such 
an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 15 years (in the case of any 
other offense), or both.”).   
 3 See Maslenjak v. United States, 582 U.S. 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017).  
 4 United States v. Maslenjak, 821 F.3d at 680. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id.  
 7 Id. 
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immigrated to the United States and settled in Ohio in 2000 where they were 
granted permanent resident status in 2004.8 
In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security investigated Divna’s 
husband, Ratko, for failing to disclose military service in Serbia on his 
immigration application.9  Ratko served in a brigade that committed war 
crimes, although there is no evidence he was personally involved in the 
crimes.10  Nevertheless, he was arrested in December 2006 for making a false 
statement on a government document.11  A week after Ratko’s arrest, Divna 
Maslenjak filed a N-400 Application for Naturalization that stated she had 
never “knowingly given false or misleading information to any U.S. 
government official while applying for any immigration benefit or to avoid 
deportation, exclusion, or removal” or “lied to any U.S. government official 
to gain entry or admission into the United States.”12  Divna Maslenjak was 
naturalized on August 3, 2007.13  
Ratko Maslenjak was convicted and thus subject to removal, so he filed a 
petition for asylum.14  Divna filed an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative and 
testified in her husband’s asylum hearing.  During the hearing, she admitted 
to lying to immigration officers about her husband’s military service.  
Further, she admitted to lying when she told immigration officers the pair 
had lived apart while in Bosnia.15  Divna Maslenjak was subsequently 
indicted by a federal grand jury for “knowingly procuring her naturalization 
contrary to law in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a)” and “knowingly 
misusing her unlawfully issued certificate of naturalization to file a Form I-
130 Petition for Alien Relative on February 6, 2009, to obtain lawful 
permanent resident status for her husband, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1423.”16  A jury found her guilty on both charges and granted the 
government’s motion to revoke her naturalized status under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1451(e).17 
The case was appealed to the Sixth Circuit.  The first issue before the 
court was whether 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) contained an implied requirement of 
materiality when naturalized citizens face mandatory denaturalization after 
                                                                                                                   
 8 Id.  
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. at 675. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. at 680. 
 13 Id.  
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 675. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
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conviction.18  The Sixth Circuit held that proof of a material false statement 
is not necessary to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a).19  The 
court reasoned there is no statutory support for the materiality requirement 
because it is not in the text of the statute.20  The court dismissed the position 
of previous courts, particularly the Ninth Circuit, which had read in a 
materiality requirement.  The Sixth Circuit said that reading in a materiality 
requirement would be “inconsistent with other laws criminalizing false 
statements in immigration proceedings and regulating the naturalization 
process.”21  The court also reasoned that the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) created a two track system that has both civil and criminal 
denaturalization, and the lack of a materiality requirement would be justified 
by the fact a higher burden (beyond reasonable doubt) must be met to trigger 
mandatory denaturalization in the criminal context.22  As a result of the 
court’s ruling, Divna Maslenjak filed a writ of certiorari in September 2016 
to have her case heard by the Supreme Court.23  The Maslenjaks were 
deported to Serbia at the end of September 2016.24  Despite their deportation, 
the Maslenjak’s case was argued before the Supreme Court on April 26, 
2017.25  The Supreme Court issued a slip opinion on June 22, 2017 in which 
the Court vacated the Sixth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case to be 
decided in a manner consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach.26 
According to the text of the statute, any conviction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1425(a) triggers the mandatory criminal denaturalization under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1451(e).27  In making its ruling to not read in a requirement of materiality, 
the Sixth Circuit broke with every other circuit that had previously 
                                                                                                                   
 18 Id. at 682.  
 19 Id. at 683. 
 20 Id. at 682. 
 21 Id. at 683. 
 22 Id. at 683–84. 
 23 Id.; see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017) (No. 16-309).  
 24 Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Bosnian Husband, Wife 
Repatriated After More Than Decade-long Immigration Fraud Probe (Oct. 3, 2016), https:// 
www.ice.gov/news/releases/bosnian-husband-wife-repatriated-after-more-decade-long-immig 
ration-fraud-probe. 
 25 See Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017).  
 26 Id. 
 27 8 U.S.C.S. § 1451(e) (LexisNexis 2016) (stating that “[w]hen a person shall be convicted 
under section 1425 of title 18 of the United States Code of knowingly procuring naturalization 
in violation of law, the court in which such conviction is had shall thereupon revoke, set aside, 
and declare void the final order admitting such person to citizenship, and shall declare the 
certificate of naturalization of such person to be canceled.  Jurisdiction is hereby conferred on 
the courts having jurisdiction of the trial of such offense to make such adjudication.”). 
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considered the issue.28  The result would have been anyone convicted under 
18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) would be subject to mandatory criminal denaturalization 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e) regardless of whether the misstatements made to 
procure naturalization were material.  The Supreme Court overturned the 
Sixth Circuit decision, although two opinions merely concurring in the 
judgment could suggest a different result could be possible under different 
factual circumstances if the Supreme Court is ever asked to reconsider this 
statutory scheme.29  
Generally, there are two types of statutory construction courts can use to 
interpret statutes when there is more than one plausible reading.  The two 
categories are the textual/language canons of construction and the 
substantive canons of construction.30  The outcome of the inquiry into the 
canons of statutory construction will determine what possible solutions there 
are to the issues outlined above when mandatory criminal denaturalization is 
the result of a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) regardless of materiality.  
Although the Sixth Circuit thought it had a more accurate reading of the 
statutory scheme between 18 U.S.C. § 1425 and 8 U.S.C. § 1451 under the 
textual canons of construction, Justice Kagan argued in her majority opinion 
that the “procure, contrary to law” language meant that any misstatement had 
to necessarily be material.31  In addition, the Ninth Circuit and Supreme 
Court’s readings are supported even more by the substantive canons of 
construction.32  
The Supreme Court resolved the circuit-split to the advantage of several 
policy-based considerations.  First, by following the Sixth Circuit’s 
interpretation, the United States would have risked violating its own 
longstanding domestic policies of immigration, robbing itself of productive 
members of society.  The United States has long sought to promote robust 
immigration that would lead to productive immigrants becoming part of the 
nation’s citizenry.  George Washington, for example, sought to attract 
immigrants to the United States that would be “sober, industrious, and 
                                                                                                                   
 28 See United States v. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1992); see, e.g., United States v. 
Aladekoba, 61 Fed. App’x 27 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Alferahin, 433 F.3d 1148 (9th 
Cir. 2006). 
 29 Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017); see also James F. Spriggs II & 
Thomas G. Hansford, Explaining the Overruling of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent, 63 J. POL. 
1091, 1105 (2001).  
 30 Larry Eig, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends (Congressional 
Research Service, Dec. 9, 2011), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf. 
 31 Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017); see generally Eig, supra note 30.  
 32 Eig, supra note 30. 
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virtuous members of Society.”33  James Madison advocated for immigrants 
so long as they would be “a real addition to the wealth or strength of the 
United States” and were willing to assimilate and incorporate themselves 
into the American society.34  Today, the goals of the United States in the 
immigration system are to 
reunite families . . . admit workers with specific skills and to 
fill positions in occupations deemed to be experiencing labor 
shortages . . . provide a refuge for people who face the risk of 
political racial, or religious persecution . . . [and] ensure 
diversity by providing admission to people from countries with 
historically low rates of immigration to the United States.35 
The mandatory criminal denaturalization process would be too rigid in many 
instances if materiality is not required and could lead to the deportation of 
formerly-naturalized citizens that have been nothing but “sober, industrious, 
and virtuous” members of the United States since immigrating to the 
country.36 
Further, if the United States were to deport denaturalized citizens, it could 
violate the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Convention to which it is a party.  
The 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Convention incorporates the first thirty-
four articles of the original Refugee Convention in 1951.37  Articles 32 and 
33 of the Refugee Convention, which the United States is bound to follow as 
a party to the 1967 Protocol, may present particular trouble within the global 
community if the United States mandatorily denaturalized and then deported 
immigrants that did not give material false statements but were still 
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a).38  In addition, the United Nations High 
                                                                                                                   
 33 Letter from President George Washington to Rev. Francis Adrian Vanderkemp (May 28, 
1788), http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/letter-to-reverend-francis-adrian-van 
derkemp/. 
 34 James Madison, Naturalization, [3 February] 1790, Founders Online, National Archives, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-13-02-0018 (last modified Feb. 1, 2018). 
 35 Immigration Policy in the United States, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (2006), https://www.cbo. 
gov/sites/default/files/109th-congress-2005-2006/reports/02-28-immigration.pdf. 
 36 Letter from President George Washington to Rev. Francis Adrian Vanderkemp, supra 
note 33. 
 37 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223 [hereinafter 
1967 Protocol]. 
 38 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 32, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 
[hereinafter 1951 Convention] (stating that refugees can only be expelled for compelling 
reasons of national security, the expulsion process must afford refugees due process of law, 
and expelled refugees have to be given a “reasonable period” to seek entry into another 
country); id. art. 33 (stating that refugees cannot be expelled back into a country where they 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2018  5:19 PM 
2018] MATERIALITY 761 
 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) currently maintains that the principle 
of non-refoulement is customary international law due to widespread state 
practice.39  Therefore, if naturalized citizens were to be mandatorily 
denaturalized and yet still maintained refugee status, the United States would 
have either subjected those people to life as second-class or shadow-class 
citizens in the United States or risked violating its international obligations 
by deporting former citizens that are denaturalized. 
This Note will first discuss the Maslenjak case as well as United States v. 
Puerta40 and their disparate impacts on the United States’ immigration 
scheme.  This will require a look into the denaturalization process as a 
whole, including a comparison of the civil and criminal denaturalization 
processes.  Comparing the two is necessary because of the different burdens 
of proof in criminal and civil cases.  Further, criminal denaturalization in this 
context is mandatory, while civil denaturalization is at the discretion of the 
court.  
In part, this Note will also discuss and evaluate the canons of statutory 
construction in order to demonstrate how they support either the Sixth or 
Ninth Circuit readings.  In part, this Note will explain why the mandatory 
criminal denaturalization process, as interpreted by the Sixth Circuit, would 
have raised complications for the United States both domestically and 
internationally.  The Sixth Circuit ruling ran afoul of the longstanding 
domestic policies in favor of bringing immigrants into the country and giving 
them the chance to become naturalized citizens in the first place.  The United 
States would also have risked a choice between subjecting formerly-
naturalized citizens to second-rate citizenship or violating obligations under 
the 1967 Protocol by deporting them.  Finally, in part, this Note will examine 
the Supreme Court’s decision and comment on why there could still be cause 
for concern despite the fact that the Court overturned the Sixth Circuit.  
Ultimately, the only way to resolve this issue conclusively may be a change 
to the text of the statutory scheme by Congress. 
                                                                                                                   
would be threatened on grounds of “race, religion, nationality, [or] membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion”). 
 39 UNHCR Note on the Principal of Non-Refoulement, UNHCR (Nov. 1997), http://www. 
refworld.org/docid/438c6d972.html. 
 40 United States v. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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II.  THE LAW OF DENATURALIZATION AND DEPORTATION 
A.  United States v. Puerta 
The Sixth Circuit in Maslenjak acknowledged its reasoning differed from 
Puerta and its progeny.41  The Puerta court cited the materiality requirement 
in 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), as well as the fact that both parties had previously 
agreed on a materiality requirement, as the reasons for finding that a false 
statement had to be material in order to convict under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a).42  
The Puerta court also argued that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kungys v. 
United States supported the conclusion that there was an implied materiality 
requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a), citing the “ ‘gravity of the 
consequences.’ ”43  The court in Maslenjak criticized these justifications, 
noting that “material” does not appear in either § 1425(a) or § 1451(e) and 
other statutes pertaining to false statements made in immigration proceedings 
do not require materiality.44  Further, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that while 
the parties in Puerta agreed that there was a materiality requirement, the 
parties did not agree in Maslenjak.45  According to the Sixth Circuit, the final 
reason why the court in Puerta was wrong was the heightened burden of 
proof in criminal denaturalization (compared to the civil proceeding) negated 
the concerns of the Puerta court about the “gravity of consequences.”46 
B.  Proliferation of a Circuit Split After the Sixth Circuit Decision  
Since the Maslenjak decision was handed down by the Sixth Circuit in 
April 2016, several courts have reacted to the court’s holding that immaterial 
false statements are enough to evidence a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) 
and trigger mandatory criminal denaturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e).  A 
few examples that preceded the Supreme Court’s decision to overturn the 
Sixth Circuit are presented here.  The Sixth Circuit handled a similar case in 
which the court emphatically reaffirmed its opinion of the materiality 
requirement from Maslenjak.47  The Southern District of Florida expressly 
                                                                                                                   
 41 Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017).  
 42 Puerta, 982 F.2d at 1297. 
 43 Id. at 1301 (quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988)). 
 44 Maslenjak, 821 F.3d at 675. 
 45 Id.  
 46 Id. at 692. 
 47 United States v. Al-Kadumi, 661 Fed. App’x 340 (6th Cir. 2016).  The court in this case 
held that an Iraqi man who knowingly assumed the identity of someone else in order to obtain 
refugee status through the UNHCR and the United States had violated § 1425(a) and was subject 
to mandatory denaturalization, regardless of the materiality of his misrepresentation. Id. 
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found that 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) does not include an implied element of 
materiality.48  Two more courts, while not directly addressing the issue of 
whether materiality is an implied element of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a), 
commented at least somewhat favorably in dicta on the Maslenjak court’s 
holding that the elements of criminal and civil denaturalization are 
different.49  A district court in Iowa expressly rejected the Maslenjak court’s 
approach, finding that there is a materiality requirement for both § 1425(a) 
and § 1425(b).50  Of course, the Supreme Court also read-in a materiality 
requirement, foreclosing the issue for the immediate future.51  
C.  The Supreme Court’s Decision 
At first glance, it would seem the Supreme Court’s 9–0 decision would 
foreclose many of the issues expected to result from the Sixth Circuit’s 
reading of the statutory scheme.52  Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, 
held the word “procure” meant that false statements had to be material to the 
naturalization process, as otherwise they would not have been used to 
“procure” naturalization.53  However, the Court did not stop there.  Justice 
Kagan also established a few standards to be used by the lower courts going 
forward to determine whether mistakes are material.54  Kagan says the lie by 
a defendant “must have played a role in her naturalization” or the true facts 
behind the lie must be of a nature that, when investigated, would lead “to the 
                                                                                                                   
 48 United States v. Santos, No. 1:15-cr-20865-LENARD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97500 
(S.D. Fla. July 26, 2016). The court issued an order for the sole purpose of establishing that 
§ 1425(a) contained no materiality requirement, relying extensively on the Maslenjak 
decision. Id.   
 49 United States v. Nguyen, 829 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 2016) (mentioning the Maslenjak court’s 
holding that the materiality requirements were different for criminal and civil denaturalization, 
but determined that they did not have to reach that question to rule that most of the 
defendant’s convictions should be upheld); United States v. Haultain, No. 5:15-CV-6141-FJG, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122792 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 12, 2016) (endorsing the differences in the 
criminal and civil denaturalization processes in order to make the point that even if the 
government declined to pursue criminal denaturalization in connection with a criminal 
conviction, the government could still later pursue civil denaturalization for related events).  
 50 United States v. Ngombwa, No. 14-CR-123-LRR, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118926 (N.D. 
Iowa Jan. 10, 2016).  The court in this case rejects the government’s contention that § 1425(b) 
has no materiality requirement, and further goes on to assert that § 1425(a) has no materiality 
requirement either, finding the Kungys ruling applicable and in conflict with the Maslenjak 
court’s ruling. Id. 
 51 Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1931 (2017). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 1920. 
 54 Id. at 1929. 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2018 5:19 PM 
764  GA. J. INT’L & COMP.  L. [Vol. 46:755 
 
 
discovery of other facts which would” change the naturalization decision.55  
If the government relies on the investigation theory going forward, it must 
prove that the “misrepresented fact was sufficiently relevant to one or 
another naturalization criterion that it would have prompted reasonable 
officials . . . to undertake further investigation.”56  Plus, the government 
would have to establish the investigation “would predictably have disclosed 
some legal disqualification.”57  Taking Kagan’s opinion on its own, it seems 
airtight and appears to avoid many of the potential issues that could have 
been caused by the Sixth Circuit’s ruling. 
However, both Justice Gorsuch and Justice Alito wrote opinions 
concurring in the judgment that cast doubt on how the extent the 
denaturalization and deportation issues described in this Note will be 
avoided.  Justice Gorsuch’s opinion, which Justice Thomas joined, concurred 
with the result of the majority.58  Gorsuch also attacked the standards 
established by the Kagan opinion, saying they were an overreach; Gorsuch 
wanted the court to simply rule that causation was required, but allow the 
district courts and courts of appeal to sort out the exact standards to apply.59  
Alito, concurring only in the judgment, took it a step further.  He still wanted 
to prevent denaturalization based on purely immaterial false statements, but 
maintained that no causation was necessary to denaturalize a citizen as long 
as the statement was material.60  Thus, under Alito’s opinion concurring in 
the judgment, “if a defendant knowingly performs a substantial act that he or 
she thinks will procure naturalization, that is sufficient for conviction.”61  
This falls far short of the standard of proof required by Justice Kagan.  
The opinions concurring in the judgment could re-open this split and 
cause many of the same problems as the Sixth Circuit opinion might have 
caused.  For one, lower courts could seize on the Gorsuch opinion and 
determine that Kagan’s standards established in Part B of her opinion are 
mere dicta.62  If that happens, the case could come back up to the Supreme 
Court, and on facts less egregious than the Maslenjak facts, the Court might 
                                                                                                                   
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 1918. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 1931 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  
 59 Id. at 1932. 
 60 Id. (Alito, J., concurring). 
 61 Id. at 1932–33. 
 62 See Pierre N. Leval, Madison Lecture: Judging Under the Constitution, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1249 (2006) (explaining how courts often find holdings to be dicta and vice versa). 
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come out differently.63  Such a result would have the potential to subject 
many naturalized citizens to the ill results discussed in this Note.  The Alito 
opinion concurring in the judgment is even more problematic, and in a 
similar way.  The Alito opinion could encourage courts to challenge Kagan’s 
standard as mere dicta, which would likely result in an appeals process that 
would land a similar case right back in the Supreme Court.  If this dispute 
were to come up in a few more years with a more conservative Supreme 
Court, it seems possible the court could seize on one of these opinions 
concurring in the judgment and re-open the problems caused by the Sixth 
Circuit opinion detailed throughout this Note.  
D.  The History and Procedure of Denaturalization 
It is necessary to delve into the differences of the civil and criminal 
denaturalization process in order to demonstrate that quick, ministerial 
criminal denaturalization is unfair for defendants accused of making 
immaterial false statements to procure naturalization.  The process is unfair, 
since it does not allow judges to examine the particulars of each case.  While 
the civil denaturalization process is procedurally complex, the criminal 
denaturalization process is straightforward.  The Sixth Circuit in Maslenjak 
noted that the criminal denaturalization process is mandatory and endorsed 
the view of other circuits that the process is purely ministerial.64  The burden 
of proof that the government must meet, as in all criminal proceedings, is 
beyond reasonable doubt.65 
On the other hand, the civil denaturalization process is far more 
complex.66  Congress originally gave the Attorney General (now the 
                                                                                                                   
 63 James F. Spriggs II & Thomas G. Hansford, Explaining the Overruling of U.S. Supreme 
Court Precedent, 63 J. POL. 1091 (2001) (showing that cases with multiple opinions are about 
22% more likely to be overturned per concurring opinion).  
 64 Id.; see United States v. Inocencio, 328 F.3d 1207, 1209 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that the 
criminal denaturalization process is purely ministerial and thus, district courts have no 
oversight or discretion as to whether to denaturalize someone under 1451(e) who has been 
convicted under 1425(a)). 
 65 Ryan Petersen, Comment, Be Our Guest, But Please Don’t Stay: A Comparison of U.S. 
and German Immigration Policies and Guest Worker Programs, 14 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L 
L. 87, 109 (2006).  
 66 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1994) (describing the civil denaturalization process as follows: 
“Concealment of material evidence; refusal to testify.  It shall be the duty of the United States 
attorneys for the respective districts, upon affidavit showing good cause therefor, to institute 
proceedings in any district court of the United States in the judicial district in which the 
naturalized citizen may reside at the time of bringing suit, for the purpose of revoking and 
setting aside the order admitting such person to citizenship and canceling the certificate of 
naturalization on the ground that such order and certificate of naturalization were illegally 
procured or were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation, 
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Department of Homeland Security) the full ability to naturalize, and the 
courts were given the full ability to denaturalize.67  The naturalization 
process did not provide an apparatus for revoking improperly procured 
naturalization until 1906, and the provisions of cancelling naturalization 
were reasserted in the Nationality Act of 1940.68  The Immigration and 
Nationality Act changed the ability to reverse illegally procured 
naturalizations, but Congress restored the ability in 1961.69  Ultimately, the 
policy behind the creation of denaturalization proceedings was to rectify 
improper judicial naturalizations.70  The denaturalization process only 
applies to grants of citizenship procured through the naturalization process; it 
does not apply to administrative certificates recognizing citizenship status.71  
A civil denaturalization suit occurs in equity and must adhere to the rigid 
statutory scheme.72  The civil denaturalization process adheres to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure where procedure is not specified in the statutes.73  
However, the Supreme Court has said that despite the civil denaturalization 
process being considered a suit in equity and district courts having some 
limited discretion, equitable principles cannot be applied in order to excuse 
illegal or fraudulent behavior.74 
With respect to the civil denaturalization process, misstatements surely 
must be material to trigger denaturalization.  However, the standard for what 
may be material has not been definitely answered.75  In fact, in the United 
States v. Kungys case, the eight justices who heard the case issued five 
different opinions, which produced greater uncertainty as to the dividing line 
between what is and is not material in denaturalization proceedings.76 
The first inquiry and investigation into the potential denaturalization of a 
naturalized citizen is brought forth by the District Directors of the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services.77   The matter then proceeds to a 
Regional Director, with a recommendation whether to institute 
                                                                                                                   
and such revocation and setting aside of the order admitting such person to citizenship and 
such canceling of certificate of naturalization shall be effective as of the original date of the 
order and certificate, respectively. . . .”). 
 67 7-96 IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 96.08 (Matthew Bender ed., 2016). 
 68 Id.  
 69 Id.  
 70 Id. 
 71 Id.  
 72 Id. § 96.10.  
 73 Id.  
 74 Id.  
 75 Id. § 96.08. 
 76 Id.  
 77 Id.  
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2018  5:19 PM 
2018] MATERIALITY 767 
 
denaturalization proceedings.78  In most instances, the Office of Immigration 
Litigation of the Civil Division, Department of Justice supervises the 
denaturalization proceedings.79   
When a naturalized citizen is denaturalized, the immediate effect of 
denaturalization is to revoke their status as a United States citizen, restore 
their former alien status, and make them subject to all consequences of alien 
status.80  They may not be subjected to deportation or removal unless they 
are deportable for illegal entry or other immigration violations.81  Some 
courts have applied a sort of relation-back principle to denaturalization, 
meaning that all benefits gained while a citizen would be revoked; in this 
sense, denaturalized citizens would not be able to benefit from their illegal 
actions.82  However, in practice, denaturalized citizens are often not subject 
to deportation for actions that occurred during the time they were naturalized 
citizens.  Additionally, those who became naturalized by the preferred status 
of relatives that became citizens through deceptive practices are also not 
subject to deportation unless they participated in the deception that granted 
them preferred status.83  However, denaturalized citizens are certainly subject 
to deportation for past criminal offenses, such as former Nazis that gained 
naturalization in the United States and were subsequently deported.84  There 
is a split in the lower courts as to whether a denaturalized citizen’s spouse 
and children can still benefit from derivative rights of the person’s 
citizenship after it is revoked.85 
Once a former citizen has lost their citizenship through denaturalization, 
they become subject to deportation and removal laws and can more easily be 
deported.86  Noncitizens in the United States are still afforded due process of 
the law under the Fifth Amendment.87  However, deportation is considered a 
civil, administrative proceeding, which means certain constitutional rights 
reserved for criminal proceedings will not apply.88  An important point to 
note is that deported former citizens can be left stateless or may have to be 
                                                                                                                   
 78 Id.  
 79 Id.  
 80 Id. § 96.13. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id.  
 84 Id.  
 85 Id.  
 86 6-71 id. § 71.03. 
 87 6-72 id. § 72.04. 
 88 Peter Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1984). 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2018 5:19 PM 
768  GA. J. INT’L & COMP.  L. [Vol. 46:755 
 
 
expelled to a third country if they cannot return to their home country due to 
political or economic circumstances.89 
E.  Application of the Law to the Maslenjak Case 
The Maslenjak case is admittedly a poor factual example for the issues 
the United States could have faced if the Sixth Circuit’s reading of the 
relationship between 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e) had 
prevailed.  This is because a jury, properly instructed, might find that Divna 
Maslenjak’s false statements were material in securing naturalization 
contrary to law.90  Divna and Ratko Maslenjak lied about the primary reason 
their family was seeking asylum when Divna said that they feared 
persecution due to her husband dodging the conscription efforts of the 
Bosnian Serb army.91  Without a legitimate reason to fear persecution, the 
Maslenjaks would not have met the definition of refugee under the 1951 
Convention or 1967 Protocol updates.92  If the Maslenjaks had no reason to 
fear persecution and thus did not meet refugee status, it seems unlikely that 
the United States immigration services officials that met with them would 
have allowed them to immigrate to the United States.  As previously stated, 
both Divna and Ratko Maslenjak have already been deported to Serbia.93  
Further, even if the Maslenjaks did originally have refugee status, it is 
unclear whether they still would have maintained refugee status after Divna 
Maslenjak was naturalized and then later denaturalized.  By the time that 
Divna Maslenjak was denaturalized in 2016, the Bosnian Civil War was long 
over.94  Although the Maslenjak case is not an exemplar case of the risks of 
mandatory criminal denaturalization for material false statements used to 
procure naturalization, similar cases where the false statements are 
immaterial to naturalization and yet still trigger mandatory criminal 
denaturalization run the risk of violating both domestic immigration policies 
and international obligations of the United States.  Some examples of cases 
where the United States could violate domestic or international interests are 
discussed later in this Note. 
                                                                                                                   
 89 Id. at 26.  
 90 See Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1931 (2017). 
 91 United States v. Maslenjak, 821 F.3d 675, 680 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 92 See 1951 Convention art. 1, supra note 38; 1967 Protocol, supra note 37. 
 93 Eric Heisig, Suspected Bosnian War Criminal Awarded by Ohio Treasurer Josh Mandel 
in 2014 Deported to Serbia, CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.cleveland.com/court-
justice/index.ssf/2016/10/suspected_bosnian_war_criminal_1.html. 
 94 The Bosnian Conflict lasted from 1992–1995; a cease-fire was negotiated along with the 
help of other countries in Dayton, Ohio in 1995.  John Lampe, Bosnian Conflict, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA (May 9, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/event/Bosnian-conflict. 
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F.  The Statutory Canons of Construction 
The split between the circuits seemed to draw a contrast between some of 
the statutory canons of construction.  Typically, the canons are vital to 
statutory interpretation by the courts.  For example, the Ninth Circuit read in 
a materiality requirement where the Sixth Circuit refused to, as previously 
discussed.  There are a broad range of canons, and either reading could be 
justified depending on the canon that judges choose to lean on in their 
interpretation of the statutory scheme.  Further, the way judges frame the 
canons themselves could have a bearing on which canons they use to justify 
their reading of the text of a statute.  The canons of construction are 
interpretive tools that have been developed by judges to help clarify statutory 
uncertainty.95  Canons fall into two categories: language or linguistic and 
substantive.96  The language canons primarily help judges reach an 
interpretation through conventions like syntax, grammar, and word usage.97  
In contrast, the substantive canons reach broad judicial concerns and often 
help justices interpret beyond the four corners of the statutory text.98  At 
times, canons may overlap and even conflict with each other.   
The list of canons discussed here is not an exhaustive list of language 
canons of construction, but merely a list of a few of the vital ones.  First and 
foremost is the plain meaning rule.99  This canon of construction is exactly 
what it sounds like: the statement should be construed as it is written.100  
There is also the ordinary meaning rule, which again is exactly what it 
sounds like: if a word or phrase is not a term of art, then it should be read as 
part of the statute in the way that particular word or phrase is ordinarily 
understood.101  
Somewhat related to the ordinary meaning rule is the rule for interpreting 
“may” and “shall.”102  May should be interpreted as permissive, while shall 
should be read as a mandatory requirement.103  However, it is important to 
note that these two words have to be read within the ultimate statutory 
                                                                                                                   
 95 Eig, supra note 30.  
 96 Id.  The canons have been used in Anglo-American law since at least 1584, and one 
recent study has found that the usage of canons is actually increasing, with the Supreme Court 
relying on the canons in over 40% of their majority opinions.  Jacob Scott, Codified Canons 
and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 344 (2010). 
 97 Eig, supra note 30. 
 98 Id. at 2.  
 99 Id. at 3.  
 100 Id.  
 101 Id.  
 102 Id.  
 103 Id.  
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scheme, and it should be taken into account whether the statute seems to 
compel mandatory or permissive behavior.104  In the instant case, the statutes 
contain strong “shall” language, which could be read to demonstrate criminal 
denaturalization is mandatory, not permissive.105   
The final language canon of construction discussed here examines how a 
court will handle a similar word or phrase appearing multiple times in a 
statute.  If a word or phrase is used several times in the same statute, then 
that word or phrase will generally be given the same meaning each time.106  
Similarly, if a word appears in one part of a statute but not another, it will 
generally be read as though Congress intentionally left the word out where it 
is not present.   Thus, the word will not be read into the statute.107 
The substantive canons, on the other hand, tend to be overarching 
principles beyond the text of the statute that are used to justify a particular 
substantive result.108  For example, the Supreme Court assumes Congress 
enacts statutes with the common law in mind, and further assumes Congress 
is wary of overturning common law for the benefit of a statute unless there is 
a clear statutory indication that the two are incompatible.109  The Court also 
tends to avoid finding a statute unconstitutional if at all possible.110  This 
tends to hold true even if there is a plausible reading of the statute that would 
make it unconstitutional.111  However, the Court will not read the statute in 
the unconstitutional manner, unless the clear intent of Congress is for the 
statute to be read in that manner.112  
The rule of lenity is one of the most important substantive canons of 
statutory construction.  In regards to criminal statutes, the rule of lenity 
dictates any ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the person being 
charged under the statute.113  The justification behind this principle is that 
Congress (and state legislatures), rather than the courts, should speak clearly 
and unambiguously when it comes to criminal laws.114 
The Charming Betsy presumption is a substantive canon of statutory 
construction that has particular applicability to international law.  The 
standard, first espoused by Chief Justice John Marshall in 1804, requires that 
                                                                                                                   
 104 Id. 
 105 8 U.S.C.S. § 1451(e) (LexisNexis 2016); 18 U.S.C.S. § 1425(a) (LexisNexis 2016). 
 106 Eig, supra note 30, at 18.  
 107 Id. at 19.  
 108 Id. at 22.  
 109 Id. at 23. 
 110 Id. at 27.  
 111 Id.  
 112 Id.  
 113 Id. at 34.  
 114 Id.  
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statutes enacted by Congress be read, whenever possible, so as not to conflict 
with international law.115  Recently the Charming Betsy presumption has 
received some pushback from the Chevron doctrine, which states the 
Supreme Court should side with administrative agencies that have given a 
reasonable construction to an unambiguous statute because some agency 
readings conflict with the principles and obligations of international law.116  
However, it seems that the Charming Betsy presumption remains in force, at 
least for now.117  All of the canons discussed above could have bearing on 
the interpretation of the statutory scheme between 8 U.S.C. § 1451 and 18 
U.S.C. § 1425. 
G.  Theories of Statutory Interpretation 
Although theories of statutory interpretation may be grouped in a variety 
of ways, one scholar posits a scheme where there are three theories of 
statutory interpretation which seem to guide decision-makers (justices, 
agencies, or even just citizens) on which canons to rely on most heavily.118  
Over time, it seems likely that individual decision-makers will use a mixture 
of language and substantive canons depending on the case in front of them.  
The three theories are the intentionalist theory, the new textualist theory, and 
the pragmatic theory.119  
Intentionalism, or the intentionalist theory, emphasizes applying the 
canons of statutory construction to reveal the intent of the legislature above 
all else.120  Intentionalism holds that statutes are the product of representative 
democracy, so the will of the people is represented by the legislature, which 
constitutes intent.121  Proponents of intentionalism recognize the inherent 
flaws and inconsistencies of searching for subjective intent within statutes, so 
they look to the text, structure, history, and purpose surrounding a statute in 
an attempt to glean the objective intent of the legislature.122  Therefore, 
                                                                                                                   
 115 Alex O. Canizares, Is Charming Betsy Losing Her Charm? Interpreting U.S. Statutes 
Consistently with International Trade Agreements and the Chevron Doctrine, 20 EMORY INT’L 
L. REV. 591 (2006); see Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804) (applying the 
Charming Betsy presumption for the first time).  
 116 Canizares, supra note 115.  The Chevron Doctrine or “Chevron deference” was defined 
by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984). 
 117 Canizares, supra note 115, at 648. 
 118 Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 
347–48 (2010). 
 119 Id. at 347. 
 120 Id. at 348. 
 121 Id.  
 122 Id.  
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intentionalists typically attempt to show some manifest evidence of objective 
intent rather than attempting to discover what the legislature intended in 
enacting a given statute.123  
New textualists endorse the idea of illuminating the objective intent of 
legislatures, but they advocate a narrower version of intentionalism.124  New 
textualists find the theories of interpretation of intentionalists too 
indeterminate and as a result view the statutory language itself as the best 
evidence of legislative intent.125  Thus, new textualists disregard legislative 
history as a means of interpretation of legislative intent.126  New textualism, 
though, is less strict than traditional textualism because it disregards strict 
textual readings that would produce absurd results.127  The new textualists 
still rely on the statutory language, but they do so by looking at the statute in 
context.128 
The pragmatic theory is more flexible in the interpretive devices that it 
relies upon because pragmatists tend to use multiple supporting arguments 
rather than one central theme.129  Thus, a true pragmatist uses a multitude of 
canons of construction and weighs several competing interpretations and 
arguments against one another.130  The pragmatic theory is said to proceed 
from concrete to the abstract in seeking to interpret specific statutes.131  
Pragmatism strives to consider a variety of approaches to statutory 
interpretation, but critics of the pragmatic theory are concerned that justices 
have too much leeway and their interpretive methodology is too 
undisciplined.132 
The circuit split on the reading of the statutory scheme at issue in 
Maslenjak also presents an opportunity to examine how the Supreme Court 
employs the canons of construction to elucidate the operation of statutory 
scheme created by Congress.  As previously stated, the canons of statutory 
construction can be grouped in two ways: language and linguistic canons and 
substantive canons.133  At the circuit level, it seemed the language canons 
favored the Sixth Circuit reading, while the substantive canons favored the 
Ninth Circuit reading.  The plain meaning rule dictates the word “material” 
                                                                                                                   
 123 Id. (emphasis added). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id.  
 126 Id.  
 127 Id.  
 128 Id.  
 129 Id. at 348–49. 
 130 Id. at 349. 
 131 Id.  This movement from concrete to abstract is known as the “funnel of abstraction.” Id.  
 132 Id.  
 133 Eig, supra note 30. 
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should not be read into § 1451(e) or § 1425(a).134  Section 1451(e) requires 
denaturalization upon “knowingly procuring naturalization in violation of 
law.135  Section 1425(a) provides for violations only when someone 
“knowingly procures or attempts to procure, contrary to law . . . .”136  
Arguably, the plain meaning rule is inapplicable and the statute is 
ambiguous, since neither § 1451(e) nor § 1425(a) contain a materiality 
standard.  The Supreme Court maintained the word “procured” implied a 
material false statement was required, as citizenship could not be “procured” 
without the false statement having some impact.137  Therefore, the plain 
meaning rule was implicitly used by the Supreme Court justices to justify 
their decision, though it could have arguably supported the Sixth Circuit’s 
reading. 
The similar words or phrases canon, as well as the logical converse of it, 
seems to also favor the Sixth Circuit’s ruling.138  In this instance, a 
materiality requirement is clearly stated in § 1451(a), but not § 1451(e) or 
§ 1425(a).  While it can be argued that this was a mistake by the legislature, 
there is no evidence supporting this argument.  Since there is no evidence of 
a mistake by the legislature, the most obvious assumption based on the text is 
that Congress intended to leave out the materiality requirement in § 1451(e) 
and § 1425(a).139  In fact, this was a major component of the Sixth Circuit’s 
opinion in the Maslenjak case.140  Though it would seem the strong weight of 
the language canons of construction seems supportive the Sixth Circuit’s 
reading of the statutory scheme, the Supreme Court justices apparently found 
otherwise. 
In addition, the substantive canons clearly weighed more heavily in favor 
of the Ninth Circuit’s reading.  Arguably, the Sixth Circuit’s reading would 
have violated the Charming Betsy presumption.141  However, the Charming 
Betsy presumption would not have been technically violated because the 
Sixth Circuit’s reading only makes denaturalization mandatory for 
immaterial misstatements, not deportation.  Deportation is the only end-game 
for denaturalized former citizens other than allowing them to remain in the 
United States without citizenship rights and under a “deportable alien” 
classification.  Therefore, the Supreme Court may have anticipated in its 
                                                                                                                   
 134 See id. (defining the plain meaning canon).  
 135 8 U.S.C.S. § 1451(e) (LexisNexis 2016). 
 136 18 U.S.C.S. §1425(a) (LexisNexis 2016). 
 137 Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1924–25 (2017). 
 138 See Eig, supra note 30, at 14–15 (defining the similar words or phrases canon). 
 139 See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1451(e) (LexisNexis 2016); 18 U.S.C.S. § 1425(a) (LexisNexis 2016). 
 140 United States v. Maslenjak, 821 F.3d 675, 683 (2016).  
 141 See Canizares, supra note 115 (explaining the history and context of the Charming Betsy 
presumption).  
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decision that the Sixth Circuit’s reading runs too much of a risk of violating 
Articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 Convention, which are later discussed in more 
detail.  
The rule of lenity also weighed in favor of the Ninth Circuit’s reading.142  
Section 1425(a) is seemingly ambiguous because it does not specify whether 
false statements must be material.143  If the statute is ambiguous, then the 
criminal defendant should prevail in the dispute.144  Siding with criminal 
defendants on this statutory scheme would have the practical result of 
upholding the Ninth Circuit’s reading and overruling the Sixth Circuit. 
Courts are typically deferential to prior decisions.145  This pattern of 
deference is actually described by the court in Maslenjak when the court 
discusses the progeny of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Puerta.146  The Court 
likely considered the potential to destabilize the immigration scheme and 
cause serious issues for the United States domestically and abroad when 
handing down its decision.  The Court’s result was indeed consistent with the 
weight of authority that follows the Ninth Circuit’s reading of the statutory 
scheme.  
Theoretically, a Supreme Court justice’s philosophy should weigh heavily 
on a decision involving such precise interpretation of a statutory scheme.  
This is seemingly evident with conservative justices like Gorsuch and Alito, 
writing in concurrence with the majority opinion, where they demonstrate 
their reliance on the text of the statute.147  It would be difficult to fit the 
intentionalist school securely into either of the Circuits’ readings of the 
statutory scheme.148  It seems the material requirement was intentionally left 
out of § 1451(e), since the materiality requirement appears in one part of the 
section but not another.  However, the intentionalists could look at the 
history of immigration and determine that the Founders would not have 
advocated for such a reading given their desire for a robust immigration 
system.  An intentionalist justice could further determine that the legislature 
made a mistake in omitting materiality.  Justices subscribing to the pragmatic 
school of statutory interpretation would be more likely to overturn the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision.149  These justices would be willing to use the more 
                                                                                                                   
 142 See Eig, supra note 30, at 30–31 (explaining the rule of lenity). 
 143 18 U.S.C.S. § 1425(a) (LexisNexis 2016). 
 144 Eig, supra note 30, at 30–31.  
 145 See id. 
 146 United States v. Maslenjak, 821 F.3d 675, 690–91 (2016). 
 147 Scott, supra note 118 (explaining the new textualist theory).  See also Maslenjak v. 
United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1931–32 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); id. at 1932–33 
(Alito, J., concurring). 
 148 See Scott, supra note 118 (explaining the intentionalist theory). 
 149 See id. at 406–08 (explaining the pragmatic theory). 
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abstract substantive canons to reach the ideal reading of the statute.  Here, 
justices that might be expected to be pragmatists in fact used both sets of 
canons, conceivably strengthening the majority’s decision to read in the 
materiality requirement.150  
III.  POTENTIAL VIOLATIONS OF DOMESTIC POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS 
A.  Early Domestic Views on Immigration 
Immigration and subsequent naturalization can be, and historically have 
often been, beneficial both to the individual entering the United States and to 
the United States itself.  By denaturalizing citizens, the United States could 
jeopardize those former citizens’ ability to work and live within the country.  
Noncitizens who have lived in the United States for five years as lawful 
permanent residents and can demonstrate good moral character, proficiency 
in English, and knowledge of U.S. history are eligible for naturalization.151  
The waiting period for noncitizens may be three years if they gained lawful 
permanent resident status through marriage to a citizen.152  Immigrants who 
become naturalized citizens receive new benefits such as security from 
deportation, the right to vote, the ability to obtain public sector jobs, and the 
ability to use a U.S. passport abroad.153  Citizens also tend to get priority 
when they attempt to bring family members who are seeking permanent 
resident status to the United States.  In most circumstances, any children of 
U.S. citizens that are born abroad will also be citizens of the United States.154 
The efficacy and scope of immigration and naturalization has been 
discussed since the founding of the country.  First and foremost, the 
Founding Fathers left the regulation of naturalization to Congress.155  The 
Founding Fathers were quite liberal when it came to allowing immigrants 
into the country.  When the first Congress passed the Naturalization Act of 
                                                                                                                   
 150 Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. at 1930–31.  
 151 WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43366, U.S. NATURALIZATION POLICY 
(2014). 
 152 Naturalization for Spouses of U.S. Citizens, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs. (Jan. 22, 
2013), https://www.uscis.gov/us-citizenship/citizenship-through-naturalization/naturalization-
spouses-us-citizens.  
 153 Id.  
 154 What Are the Benefits and Responsibilities of Citizenship?, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. 
Servs., https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/article/chapter2.pdf. 
 155 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
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1790, there were almost no restrictions on immigration.156  This open 
immigration system flourished until at least 1880 because the United States 
was primarily occupied with filling out the vast expanse of the growing 
country and tapping its economic potential.157  After the Civil War, states 
began passing their own immigration laws, and the Supreme Court 
subsequently ruled that immigration was a federal responsibility.158  As the 
number of immigrants rose due to a streamlined immigration process run 
exclusively by the federal government, Congress began to pass statutes to 
slow the rate of immigration.159  
In contrast, the values of the Founding Fathers suggested they wanted an 
immigration system that would allow foreign aliens to immigrate to the 
United States, especially when facing persecution in their home countries.  
To that end, President Washington said that he “had always hoped that this 
land might become a safe and agreeable [a]sylum to the virtuous and 
persecuted part of mankind, to whatever nation they might belong.”160  
Thomas Jefferson echoed that sentiment in 1795.161  The Founding Fathers 
also advocated for immigrants that would work hard and assimilate to 
American society.  They desired immigrants and naturalized citizens that 
would be industrious and virtuous.162  As long as immigrants did not intend 
to live a life of ease, the Founders welcomed them into the country.163  Ben 
Franklin said: 
[A]ll that seems to be necessary is, to distribute them more 
equally, mix them with the English, establish English schools 
where they are now too thick settled. . . . I say I am not against 
the Admission of Germans in general, for they have their 
Virtues, their industry and frugality are exemplary; 
                                                                                                                   
 156 Kevin Portteus, Immigration and the American Founding (2012), https://www.hillsdale. 
edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/FMF-2012-Immigration-and-the-American-Founding.pdf. 
 157 Schuck, supra note 88. 
 158 Early American Immigration Policies, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs. (Sept. 4, 
2015), https://www.uscis.gov/history-and-genealogy/our-history/agency-history/early-americ 
an-immigration-policies; see Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876) (holding California’s 
statute excluding certain aliens from entering the state without paying a toll was 
unconstitutional because it infringed upon the exclusive right of Congress to make laws on the 
admission of foreign citizens). 
 159 Early American Immigration Policies, supra note 158. 
 160 Portteus, supra note 156.  
 161 See id. at 12 (describing a letter to Jean Nicolas Demeunier from Thomas Jefferson 
indicating that he shared the same hopes as Washington). 
 162 Id.  
 163 Id.  
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[t]hey . . . . contribute greatly to the improvement of the 
Country.164 
George Washington largely echoed the other Founding Fathers’ 
industrious sentiments when he said he wanted immigrants to come to 
America “who are determined to be sober, industrious and virtuous members 
of [s]ociety . . . a knowledge that these are the general characteristics of your 
compatriots would be a principal reason to consider their advent as a 
valuable acquisition to our infant settlements.”165  On assimilation, 
Washington was representative of the Founders’ views as well in saying that 
“[B]y an intermixture with our people, they, or their descendants, get 
assimilated to our customs, measures, and laws: in a word, soon become one 
people.”166  The requirement that all naturalized citizens swear an oath of 
loyalty to the Constitution further indicates the Founders’ belief in 
assimilation.167  The phrase E Pluribus Unum itself was a call to all citizens 
to assimilate for the greater good of the country.168  Ultimately, the Founding 
Fathers saw value in the naturalization of immigrants because immigrants 
had the potential to benefit society through their work ethic, diversity, and 
allegiance to the United States, which was an inherent requirement of 
citizenship.169 
B.  Modern Domestic Goals of Immigration 
Arguably, courts should care more about the modern domestic goals of 
the immigration system than the views of the Founding Fathers on 
immigration.  However, most modern goals of the immigration system seem 
to be consistent with what the Founding Fathers wanted from immigration.  
As mentioned earlier, the modern goals of the immigration system are: 
reuniting families, admitting workers with skillsets to fill labor shortages, 
providing refuge for those that need shelter, and promoting diversity.170  True 
assimilation seems to be less of a concern now than it was previously as the 
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 165 Matthew Spalding, Why Does America Welcome Immigrants?, HERITAGE FOUND. (June 30, 
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nation and world become more globalized.  Yet, some still remain concerned 
about the slow integration of immigrants into their communities.171  The 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), to that end, 
provides money and programs in order to better integrate immigrants into 
their communities.172  Of course, while the goals of immigration policy 
remain similar, there are far more restrictions now on immigration policy 
than there were in the late 1700s. 
The most substantial restrictions in modern immigration policy are related 
to concerns about national security and illegal immigration.  National 
security has been at the forefront of the immigration debate since the attacks 
that took place on September 11, 2001.  Resulting legislation like the 
PATRIOT Act has made the immigration process more difficult.  For 
example, the PATRIOT Act broadened the definition of “terrorist” and put 
the onus on the person being accused of terror to prove otherwise.173  The 
PATRIOT Act may also allow the Attorney General to indefinitely detain 
someone who is confined for a violation of conditions of entry into the 
United States but cannot be deported to his or her country of origin.174  These 
burdens on the immigration system may deter people from immigrating to 
the United States, especially from the Middle East.175  Illegal immigration 
has been at the forefront of political debates in the United States.176  
However, it is not particularly relevant to the discussion in this Note, as 
illegal immigrants are clearly not candidates for naturalization in the same 
manner as the immigrants that come to the United States through the legal 
channels of immigration. 
Despite the restrictions on immigration policy due to national security 
concerns, statistics demonstrate that the people becoming naturalized citizens 
                                                                                                                   
 171 Bret Schulte, Mexican Immigrants Prove Slow to Fit In (May 15, 2008), http://www.usnew 
s.com/news/national/articles/2008/05/15/mexican-immigrants-prove-slow-to-fit-in; Eric Bradner 
& Ted Barrett, Republicans to Obama: Keep Syrian Refugees Out (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www. 
cnn.com/2015/11/16/politics/republicans-syrian-refugees-2016-elections-obama. 
 172 USCIS Citizenship Education: Resources and Initiatives, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. 
Servs. (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.uscis.gov/us-citizenship/naturalization-test/applicant-perfor 
mance-naturalization-test/uscis-citizenship-education-resources-and-initiatives#building.  
 173 Charles Morrow, Comment, The Plight of the Highly Educated: Immigration Reform in 
the United States Post-September 11th, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 993 (2007).  
 174 Peter Siggins, Racial Profiling in the Age of Terrorism, Markkula Ctr. for Applied Ethics, 
https://www.scu.edu/ethics/focus-areas/more/resources/racial-profiling-in-an-age-of-terrorism.  
 175 See id. at 3 (discussing how students of Middle Eastern descent are watched more closely 
and questioned more often by government officials).  
 176 See, e.g., Louise Liu, Here's Where Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump Stand on 
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today meet the goals of both the Founding Fathers and modern immigration 
policy.  In fact, naturalization is often an indicator of successful 
socioeconomic integration for foreign-born residents.177  For example, in the 
1990 census, the rate of naturalization for foreign-born residents was higher 
among more educated foreign-born residents.178  While only 43.5% of 
foreign residents without a high school degree were naturalized, 65.1% of 
immigrants with college degrees were naturalized.179  In a similar vein, the 
higher the level of white collar occupation, the more likely a foreign-born 
resident was to be naturalized.180  Also related to educational experience and 
job prestige is income.  Individual naturalized citizens made about $8,000 
more per year than the average foreign-born noncitizen, and naturalized 
households made about $6,000 more per year than noncitizen households.181  
Those foreign-born residents below the poverty line naturalized at a 38% 
rate, while 60% of those least likely to be poor were naturalized.182  Foreign-
born residents that spoke English very well also naturalized at a rate of 
59.4%, while those residents that spoke English poorly or did not speak 
English at all are only naturalized at a rate of 27.4%.183  These statistics 
demonstrate that the most productive and well-integrated immigrants are the 
ones that could be potentially deported and denaturalized. 
The Sixth Circuit’s reading of the interaction between § 1451(e) and 
§ 1425(a) could have led to significant violations of domestic policy on 
immigration.  The Sixth Circuit’s decision would not have necessarily 
impeded immigration on the front-end, but it could have impeded the number 
of immigrants who seek to be naturalized.  This could certainly put more 
naturalized citizens at risk of denaturalization and possibly deportation.  
Similarly, language in Justice Alito’s concurrence in the Supreme Court 
Maslenjak decision suggests that the door could later be opened to 
deportation in cases with less egregious false statements than that of Divna 
Maslenjak.184  Immigrants who know or are worried that they may have 
made immaterial false statements when entering the country may decline to 
naturalize because they do not want to risk the false statements coming to 
light, later leading to their denaturalization (if they decide to apply for 
naturalization) and possible deportation.  It is important not to incentivize 
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lying so that immigrants can get into the country. The United States, 
however, should be concerned of robbing immigrants who are content to 
remain as lawful permanent residents or those on valid work visas, of the full 
benefits of U.S. citizenship. Overall, the Sixth Circuit’s reading of the 
statutory scheme to not require material false statements would likely have 
been over-inclusive, because it would be likely to rid the country of good, 
productive citizens.  The same risks, to a lesser extent, could exist if Alito’s 
concurrence gives rise to more denaturalized citizens.  
Immigrants that do not have citizenship have less of a stake in society.  It 
seems more likely that those immigrants, especially if they are productive 
and successful, could choose to move to another country if they have the 
financial means.  Additionally, President Washington’s hope for the United 
States to be a haven for the virtuous but persecuted masses is unlikely to be 
realized if immigrants refuse to naturalize or leave the country due to 
concerns related to false statements that could lead to denaturalization and 
deportation.185  These potential results from the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Maslenjak essentially amounted to a violation of the domestic immigration 
policy because it would have reduced the number of good potential citizens 
that will enter the country and likely could have affected how many choose 
to remain or naturalize.  Similarly, a less harsh but still problematic reality 
could be true if future courts seize on Alito’s concurrence. 
Open immigration, like the Founders advocated for, is unrealistic for the 
United States today.  For example, it has been documented how groups like 
ISIS have snuck terrorists into countries by disguising them as refugees.186  
Regardless, once immigrants are admitted to the United States, work hard, 
and want to become citizens, it does not behoove the United States to 
denaturalize those immigrants for minor false statements used to procure 
naturalization.  This is particularly true when there is a plausible way to 
construe the statutory scheme that would only make serious false statements 
criminal under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e).  
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Domestic immigration policy has long sought to incentivize productive 
immigrants to remain and integrate into society.187  By mandatorily 
denaturalizing citizens, the United States would be emphasizing the opposite.  
In fact, Ratko Maslenjak was demonstrably a productive immigrant.  In 
2014, he was given an award in Ohio for his job as a “ ‘hand finisher’ who 
carefully inspects and smooths out finished metal molds used by major 
rubber companies.”188  Again, the Maslenjaks are not an exemplar for the 
argument that immaterial false statements should not trigger mandatory 
denaturalization, since their false statements used to procure Divna 
Maslenjak’s naturalization were probably material.  Still, immigrants like the 
Maslenjaks that have been productive, valued members of their communities 
during their residency in the United States likely satisfy the Founding 
Fathers’ goals of assimilation into American society.189  Therefore, the Sixth 
Circuit’s reading would not only have adverse effects on the productiveness 
of immigrants, but could also lead to the deportation of those that are doing a 
good job of integrating into society.  In Ratko Maslenjak’s case, a productive 
immigrant (though he had not chosen to naturalize and become a citizen) 
who had not committed war crimes and was nothing but a model resident in 
the United States was deported for a single transgression.  This case 
demonstrates the point that denaturalization and deportation are unduly harsh 
punishments for minor false statements used to procure naturalization.190 
Although the facts of the Maslenjak case is not great evidence that the 
Sixth Circuit’s reading would have been detrimental to refugees seeking 
entry into and eventually citizenship in the United States, it is easy to 
imagine other cases where the Sixth Circuit’s ruling could have significantly 
affected naturalized citizens.  The Bosnian Civil War was quite short 
compared to some of the serious ongoing conflicts presently displacing 
people.  Currently, over 65 million people are estimated to be refugees or 
other forcibly-displaced persons.191  In Iraq, a country that has been in near-
constant turmoil for several decades, nearly 5 million people were dubbed 
“of concern” by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
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(UNHCR) as either refugees, asylum-seekers, or internally-displaced persons 
in recent years.192  In Colombia, the state has been in conflict with the rebel 
group FARC since 1964.193  The most extraordinary current case is in Syria, 
where the terrorist group ISIS displaced almost 7 million Syrians by the end 
of 2016.194  All of this is to say that it is possible that refugees in the future, 
considering the Alito concurrence in the Supreme Court’s decision, could 
maintain their refugee status even if they are denaturalized and lose their 
U.S. citizenship.  If that does indeed happen, the United States is stuck in a 
situation where it has taken the refugees’ benefits of citizenship but subjected 
them to a second-class life labeled as “deportable aliens.”  
C.  International Obligations of the United States 
Deportation of persons like the Maslenjaks could also potentially 
jeopardize the United States’ international law obligations.  States that are 
parties to the treaties are bound internationally (even if not domestically) to 
not take any action to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.195  The 
United States is not a party to the 1951 Convention, but it is a party to the 
1967 Protocol, which incorporates the first thirty-four articles of the 1951 
Convention.196  The United States ratified the 1967 Protocol in 1968.197  The 
ratification process makes the treaty part of the domestic law of the United 
States.198  The 1951 Convention was written, signed, and ratified in the 
aftermath of World War II, at which point various international states wanted 
to address the issue of the various refugees and other persons that had been 
displaced by the War.199  The parties to the 1951 Convention decided to set a 
temporal limit and allowed states to opt-in to a provision that would limit 
coverage only to events occurring in Europe for refugees that would be 
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protected under the treaty.200  The parties to the treaty were primarily 
concerned about future influxes of refugees that could warrant protection 
under the terms of the treaty.201  Although the treaty was supposed to 
complement the UNHCR, the UNHCR’s mandate did not restrict the 
definition of protected refugees by time or geography.202  The 1967 Protocol 
was introduced in large part to eliminate the temporal limit on the definition 
of refugee in the original 1951 Convention.203 
The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol are still central to the 
international community’s efforts to protect refugees.204  Article 1 of the 
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol defines refugees as 
 any person who is outside their country of origin and unable or 
unwilling to return there or to avail themselves of its 
protection, on account of a well-founded fear of persecution for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular group, or political opinion.  Stateless persons may 
also be refugees in this sense, where country of origin 
(citizenship) is understood as “country of former habitual 
residence.”205 
The 1951 Convention also sets the parameters for when refugee status ends.  
Refugee status lasts until and unless the refugee returns to their country of 
origin, acquires a new nationality, or circumstances change in their country 
of origin.206  
Beyond the provided definition of refugee, the 1951 Convention and 1967 
Protocol laid out several principles that are still important to the treatment of 
refugees by the global community.  Foremost among them, the UNHCR calls 
the principle of non-refoulement “the cornerstone of asylum and of 
international refugee law.”207  Non-refoulement is the broad principle that no 
refugee should be returned to a country where he would be at risk of 
persecution.208  The principle of non-refoulement was originally espoused in 
the non-binding Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 but was not 
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a binding principle on any state until the 1951 Convention.209  The 1984 
Convention Against Torture expanded the coverage of non-refoulement to 
prevent deportation of individuals to countries where the individual would be 
at substantial risk to be tortured.210  As previously stated, the principle of 
non-refoulement binds more than just the parties to the 1951 Convention and 
1967 Protocol.  In fact, it is also considered customary international law by 
the UNHCR. This means every state, regardless of whether it is a party to 
either convention, is bound to follow it.211  Some scholars even argue that 
non-refoulement is becoming non-derogable as jus cogens.212  In addition to 
protecting refugees and displaced persons from non-refoulement, the 1951 
Convention also protects refugees from penalties for illegal entry and 
prevents most expulsions.213 
In the United States, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont has attempted 
several times to update the United States’ domestic commitment to 
protecting refugees who are fleeing torture or persecution, but five bills of 
similar substance have died in the Senate since 1999.214  Senator Leahy has 
recently submitted another bill to the current Congress, which never reached 
a vote.215  That result is likely due to the current political climate.216  In 
general, reform on the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers has been 
tough for nations like the United States since the attacks on September 11, 
2001.217  Since September 11, 2001, the United States has prioritized anti-
terrorism measures over refugee protection measures.218  In doing so, the 
United States has relied on language in Article 33(2) of the 1951 
Convention.219  According to one scholar, this trend of sacrificing refugee 
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protections for anti-terrorism measures “could have a catastrophic effect, 
excluding legitimate refugees from protection, weakening the foundations of 
the refugee law regime, and undermining the legitimacy of the new 
peremptory norm.”220  Presumably, these anti-terrorism statutes enacted and 
justified under a broad reading of Article 33(2) of the 1951 Convention could 
lead to the United States violating their international law obligations in some 
instances.221 
If denaturalized former citizens maintain their refugee status, then the 
United States is at risk of violating both Articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 
Convention.222  The UNHCR holds the position that refugees expelled under 
Articles 32 or 33 do not necessarily lose refugee status.223  Therefore, the 
United States would not be able to deport denaturalized citizens maintaining 
refugee status as non-citizens without violating international law.  The 
United States would violate either their obligations under the 1967 Protocol 
or potentially the principles of non-refoulement as customary international 
law, assuming that the persons could establish they maintained refugee 
status.224  Thus, while the refugees could be denaturalized under domestic 
law and lose the benefits of citizenship, they could not be deported from the 
United States to their country of origin without violating international law.  
This possibility leaves the United States in a position of choosing between 
potentially violating Articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 Convention or allowing 
the denaturalized former-citizens to stay in the country without the rights of 
citizenship they previously would have maintained.  These citizens would 
seemingly be second-class or shadow-class citizens.  
The United States, if it expels former citizens who maintain their refugee 
status but were denaturalized for minor false statements used to procure 
naturalization, would be at risk of violating Article 32 of the 1951 
Convention. Refugees are guaranteed due process.  Under Article 32, 
refugees may only be expelled on grounds of “national security or public 
order.”225 The United States would risk violating the principles of non-
refoulement as well.  The United States could violate their obligations to not 
return refugees to areas where their life or liberty is at risk under Article 34 
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of the 1951 Convention.  Under Article 34, refugees are protected unless 
they are convicted of a “particularly serious crime” that constitutes a danger 
to the security of the country that the refugee is in at the time.  Further 
strengthening the United States’ obligations to the principle of non-
refoulement is that the UNHCR sees the right to non-refoulement as non-
derogable customary international law, meaning states can never waive the 
right of non-refoulement under any circumstance. 
The UNHCR has commented that expulsion should be a last resort for 
“exceptional circumstances,” and suggests that refugees should be treated 
leniently because they have been uprooted and have no home country to 
which they can return.226  Looking to the Maslenjaks, for example, it is hard 
to imagine how they might be a threat to national security or public order.  
The pair, regardless of their transgressions, seemed to be well-adjusted to 
their community.  And the Maslenjaks, as previously noted, would not 
necessarily still be considered refugees because of the now-stable political 
situation in Bosnia.  In a situation where persons still qualify for refugee 
status after denaturalization, the United States could not expel them from the 
country without risking violation of Article 32 unless the refugees had 
committed more criminal acts that demonstrated a propensity to be a threat to 
national security or public order.  
The fair rebuttal to this argument is that just because more citizens could 
be denaturalized, it does not necessarily follow that denaturalized former 
citizens will be deported and put the United States at risk of violating its 
obligations under the 1951 Convention.  However, this argument ignores the 
realities of former citizens that have been denaturalized.  For one, they 
instantly become aliens that are subject for removal.  The United States, 
according to the Supreme Court, cannot keep these aliens incarcerated for 
more than six months while waiting for another country to accept them for 
deportation purposes.227  Therefore, these former citizens are left with 
uncertainty about their status and would likely question whether or not they 
should continue their lives in the United States, given they can be removed at 
any time.  
In fact, the anecdotal stories about people that have been denaturalized 
but remain in the United States paint a grim picture of what life is like as a 
denaturalized former citizen living within the country.  Nada Prouty came to 
the United States from Lebanon and served as a CIA agent for several 
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years.228  She was convicted of contriving a sham marriage in order to obtain 
citizenship and was denaturalized as a result.229  She was not deported to 
Lebanon due to non-refoulement problems, and thus remains in the United 
States.230  However, she is unable to get a job, open a bank account, or travel 
beyond fifty miles from her home as someone who maintains “deportable 
alien” status and remains under surveillance by immigration officials.231  
Lionel Jean-Baptiste arrived in the United States from Haiti and was 
naturalized. Later, a drug conviction led to his denaturalization because the 
government said that it evidenced that he did not have “good moral 
character” during the application process for citizenship.232  Jean-Baptiste’s 
potential deportation did not have non-refoulement concerns, but everywhere 
the United States attempted to deport him refused to take him.233  Haiti 
rejected him because he had renounced his Haitian citizenship, and attempts 
to deport him to France and the Dominican Republic were also 
unsuccessful.234  Jean-Baptiste was released to his family, but may not have 
been able to work or drive.235  Further, like Prouty, he would remain under 
watch by immigration officials.236  
Instances like these two will increase if naturalized citizens are subject to 
denaturalization for insignificant false statements used to procure 
naturalization.  If the U.S. government does deport former citizens, it risks 
violating obligations under international law.  If the United States does not 
deport denaturalized citizens, it leaves them in an uncertain holding pattern 
as a second-class or shadow-class citizen where they have few basic 
privileges and rights that someone residing in a country might expect but 
cannot return to their country of origin.  These former citizens may be able to 
work if they can secure asylum status from within the United States.237  It is 
unclear why that was not possible for either of the citizens in the anecdotes 
above.  What is indisputable, though, is that their rights within the United 
States were drastically restricted for what amounted to minor transgressions.  
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This dilemma between making people second or shadow-class citizens or 
deporting them is just one example of the dangers of a reading of the 
statutory scheme that weakens the burden on the government to denaturalize 
citizens. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Sixth Circuit decision placed the enforcement of the statutory scheme 
in 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e) in an untenable position.  The 
statutory canons of construction illuminate the arguments that would be 
made in favor of and against the Sixth Circuit’s reading, but the Supreme 
Court employed both textual and substantive canons to rule against the Sixth 
Circuit.  The justices may have overturned the Sixth Circuit’s ruling based on 
policy concerns.  From a domestic viewpoint, the Ninth Circuit’s reading is 
far preferable because it will allow the United States to keep more 
productive, naturalized citizens in the country.  From an international 
perspective, the United States will not risk violating international obligations 
under the 1967 Protocol that would result from mandatorily denaturalizing 
citizens for immaterial false statements and deporting them.   
The Sixth Circuit’s reading of the statutory scheme also would have 
violated the domestic goal of promoting immigration of productive persons 
into the United States.  Further, if the United States were to deport 
denaturalized former citizens, it would risk violating Articles 32 and 33 of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention.  The United States is obligated to follow the 
1951 Convention through the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Convention. 
Further, the United States’ obligations to the principle of non-refoulement 
are even stronger because they are considered jus cogens and thus non-
derogable by the UNHCR.  If the United States denaturalized former citizens 
but did not deport them to avoid repercussions in international law, then it 
would subject these former citizens to a second-class lifestyle where they 
could not travel, work, or drive, and could not leave the United States for 
another country.  This would be a patently unfair result for someone who 
gave immaterial false statements in order to procure naturalization for 
themselves or for someone else.  For now, the Supreme Court has resolved 
these issues, but the fissures could easily open again due to the opinions 
concurring in the judgment that cast doubt on Justice Kagan’s majority 
opinion.  The best solution, despite the fact that the Court found there is a 
materiality requirement for false statements made to government officials to 
trigger mandatory criminal denaturalization, would be a statutory amendment 
that would add the materiality requirement to the text and render this entire 
debate moot.  
